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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LEO A. BIRD,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
CLOVER LEAF-HARRIS DAIRY,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT
Defendant is the owner of a creamery plant at 723 South
State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. It consists of several separate and disconnected buildings. The main building faces
State Street, which is the processing plant, executive offices,
etc., and is the place where all of the business is transacted.
The buildings in the rear are adjuncts to the business. The
first one back of the main building is a one story, brick building extending North and South from the South end of the lot
to about the center. Immediately to the East is a two story
building facing North (the building involved in this suit).
The ground floor is used as a garage for company delivery
trucks. The upper floor is used for storage purposes. Paralleling this building immediately to the North and facing South
is another building known as the machine shops. The area
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at times placed in the offending cars. Offenders were approached and told to remove their cars. Sometimes the cars
were removed by the plant manager. Ample space was provided for them in the parking lot.
The plant manager, pursuant to rules, made regular
periodical inspection of all of the buildings and had done so
for the last ten years. The last inspection preceding the accident was made about two months before March 6, 1939. At
that time Mr. Galligher, the local manager, Mr. Myers, a company representative, and Mr. Johnson, the plant foreman, made
a complete tour of all the buildings. They inspected the roof
of the garage building, went over it thoroughly, looked for
leaks or cracks, inspected the walls, floors, electrical wiring,
looked for evidences of cracks or weaknesses in the walls and
inspected the cement pillars. They discovered nothing to
indicate anything unusual about the building or to suggest any
inherent weaknesses. They saw no cracks in the wall.
None of the officers or employees of the company knew
of anything in or about the building, or the canopy, suggesting
inherent weaknesses or need of repairs or replacements.
When snow accumulated on the roof and canopy, men
were sent to remove the same. As many as four men have
frequently stood on the canopy and roof and shoveled heavy
snow without any indication of weakness or excessive strain.
On March 6, 1939, there was a small amount of snow
and ice on the roof, not over two ( 2) inches, and not sufficient
to require cleaning.
Leo Montell Bird, plaintiff's son, was not an employee.
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He was employed by the Milk Producers to take samples of
their individual milk as delivered, in order to provide a means
of checking with the company tests. His work was confined
exclusively to the main building, where he came each morning,
took his position near the scales and put a sample of each
producer's milk in a separate bottle reserved for that purpose.
It required about four hours each day for him to complete
his samples. He had been thus employed for about one and
one-half (1-0) years. However, his employment extended
to various creameries and dairies in Salt Lake City, Utah.
He did not carry his samples, so it was not necessary to use
a car in his employment. He usually came on a bicycle, but
occasionally his father would allow him the use of his car,
usually on Sundays or at vacation periods. The car in question
was a new Studebaker. None of the company officers knew
this car and they paid little or no attention to his coming or
going. l\1r. Johnson, the plant foreman, sometimes saw him
come on his bicycle, which he frequently put in the garage.
Sometimes he came in a coupe which he parked in the space reserved adjacent to the \Vest wall of the brick building to the
\Vest of the garage. On :J\11arch 6, 1939, he drove his father's
new 1938 Studebaker car and placed the same under the
canopy at the extreme vVestern end immediately in front of
the double doors which were closed. He did not obtain permission from anyone to park there. No company official or
employee saw him drive his car there, nor did they know that
this car belonged to him, nor did they observe the car there on
the day of the accident, nor had they ever seen this car parked
there before, although Mr. Bird claims to have parked it there
several times. There is nothing to suggest that even had an
employee seen the car, that he would have known it belonged
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to l\1r. Bird. It might have belonged to some company official
who might have the right to place it there. There was a truck
and four ( 4) passenger cars under the East canopy but none,
other than plaintiff's car, under the West canopy. As before
noted, those on the East did not directly obstruct the opening
into the garage, and cars or trucks were sometimes left there
temporarily for repairs.
On March 6, 1939, at about Eleven A. M., the West
canopy and brick wall in the second story fell. This caused
a heavy suction and the East canopy raised and then it fell,
pulling the entire upper wall down. Whether the canopy fell
before the wall or the wall before the canopy, is not known.
No warning noises were heard and no opportunity was afforded to remove any of the cars before the crash. No one knew
what caused the accident, or how it happened. Reinforced
concrete and brick are recognized as good building materials.
Canopies in front of buildings are very common, and there was
nothing in the form of construction of either to suggest weaknesses or strain, and the company was very careful in the
inspection of its buildings. The canopy was constructed by
the same contractor about one and one-half ( 1-0) years after
the building was completed. The steel supporting rods were
about eighteen ( 18) feet long, fastened to the reinforced concrete piers.
There is no contention that defendant, or any of its agents,
saw anything about the construction of the building or the
canopy suggesting any inherent weakness, nor that there was
anything which could have been observed that would have
suggested weakness or strain in or about the building.
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The car was damaged to the extent of Six Hundred Thirty
Three and 77/100 Dollars ($633.77).
Upon the foregoing evidence, all of which is undisputed,
the trial court, sitting without a jury, made findings and entered judgment in favor of plaintiff.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
Seven ( 7) errors have been assigned as follows:
1. Error in overruling defendant's demurrer.
2. Error in denying defendant's motion for a non suit.
3. Error in entering judgment in favor of plaintiff.
4. Error in making a conclusion of law,

"That the defendant's negligent acts or omission
proximately causing damage to plaintiff's property,
and that plaintiff recover damages for plaintiff and
is entitled to judgment".
5. Error in making that part of finding number Three ( 3),

"For the purpose of going to work at defendant's
dairy"
and also,
"a place where others had parked their automobiles".
6. Error in making its finding number Four ( 4)
"and while the plaintiff's automobile was parked by
the aforesaid wall with the consent and permission of
the defendant"
also,
"that defendant knew, or should have known, of the
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unsafe and unsound condition of said wall and that
the damages to plaintiff's automobile were proximately
caused as a result of the careless and negligent maintenance of said walls in an unsound and unsafe and
dangerous condition"
also,
"and which was an instrumentality peculiarly exclusive
and completely within the control and management
of the said defendant".
7. Error in failing to make findings; conclusions and enter
judgment in favor of defendant.
ARGUMENT
Plaintiff, both by pleading and proof, attempted to bring
himself within the Res Ipsa Loquitur doctrine. The trial court
evidently decided this case on that theory. We believe we can
argue all our assignments under this one general heading, as
all questions involved both in the complaint, the findings, conclusion and judgment are of necessity involved in this question.
Before embarking on a discussion of this subject, it is
important to make some preliminary observations. It is, of
course, axiomatic that one coming on others premises may be
either:
A. Trespasser
B.

Licensee

C.

Invitee

and that the duty owed by the owner is measured by this relationship.
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Before discussing or applying the so called Res Ipsa Loquitur doctrine, we must first determine the legal status of the
parties as it applies to the automobile in question.
If the boy, Leo l\Iontell Bird, had himself been injured
while in the main building, there could be no denial of the
fact that he was an invitee, but that is not this case. No injury was sustained to the boy while in a place where he was
invited. Rather, an injury happened to an automobile which
was placed where it had no right to be. This fact must not be
overlooked. l\Ierely because the defendant permitted him to
come to its plant each day to take samples of milk and, to that
extent, made him an invitee while in the plant does not mean
that it invited him to drive his car in the rear and park the
same where he had no right and, that by parking it there, the
same relation was created with respect to the automobile. We
say that by placing this car at the point indicated he was a
trespasser with respect to the duty the defendant owed the
owner in caring for the car, notwithstanding he was himself
an invitee while engaged in his occupation in the main building; that if he was not a trespasser in placing the car at the
point indicated, he was at most a mere licensee and under no
circumstances was he an invitee. He generally came on a
bicycle, so it cannot be said that the use of a car was in any
sense a part of the invitation to come and sample milk. The
defendant invited him to enter its main building each day and
take samples of producer's milk. It did not invite him to drive
an automobile in its back yard and, certainly, it never invited
him to park the same immediately in front of its garage doors
at a place where it did not even permit its own officers or
employees to park. It provided parking space for anyone who
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had occasion to visit the plant for legitimate purposes, if their
employment was such as to be inconsistent with parking their
automobiles in the public street.
Plaintiff argues that because he had done this before,
somehow he received a license to continue so to do. The difficulty with plaintiff's position rests in the fact that he failed
to show any consent, express or implied, by any officer of the
defendant company, which could bind the defendant. Plaintiff
does not contend that the boy made a regular habit of parking
there, or that he asked permission of anyone, irrespective of
whether he had authority to give such consent to park there.
He does not contend that any officer of the company saw him
park there, or knew that this particular car was driven by the
boy. He merely argues that, because some employees were
at times permitted to park their cars under the East canopy,
although in direct violation of company orders, therefore, he
had a right to drive this car under the West canopy directly
in front of the entrance doors to the garage, thereby obstructing
ingress to or egress from the building and that, because he
placed it there without the knowledge or consent of any official
of the company and in direct violation of its rules and regulations and at a place where anyone would know or readily perceive it ought not to be placed; and that, notwithstanding the
company had provided ample parking places for cars, yet because someone did not box t~e boy's ears and order him to
get the car out, irrespective of the authority of such person,
that somehow the defendant company owed the same duty
toward the protection of the car that it owed the boy while
lawfully in the building sampling milk. This seems to be a
strange conception of the law.
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Suppose, for argument sake, some employee did see Mr.
Leo 1\:lontell Bird drive the car there, although this is denied
and not proved, would such knowledge on the part of some
mere employee, without protest on his part, be sufficient to
create implied consent on the part of the defending company?
Would it not be incumbent upon plaintiff to show that officers
of the company who had authority to expressly bind it knew
of such condition and impliedly consented thereto? No such
attempt was made to bind the company in this case. Suppose
that someone did see a Studebaker car standing in front of
this garage, but he did not know who owned the car or who
drove it there. Would that fact be sufficient to authorize a
finding that the defendant had impliedly invited this boy to
park his car in that vicinity?
The mere statement of the facts demonstrate the utter
absurdity of the position. Had this boy been driving this particular automobile over a period of years and had he placed
the same regularly at this position, there might be some merit
to his contention, but here the evidence showed that the boy
usually rode a bicycle; that he had on previous occasions
driven an old Ford car which he parked in the place allotted,
and that this was a new Studebaker car which his father had
permitted him to drive on a few occasions, generally on a Sunday. There was no showing that any officer of this company
ever saw him drive this car. Does, therefore, the mere presence
of this Studebaker car at the point indicated, whether known
to some employee or not, charge the defendant company with
the responsibility of protecting this car against all hazards?
\Vhat is its responsibility? It is well established that a person
may be an invitee as to one part of the building, yet a trespas-
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ser as to some other part? The subject is discussed in the following case:
Loney vs Laramie Auto Company
255 Pac. 350
While in this case the court held that plaintiff was an invitee
with respect to the place of injury, yet the court recognizes
the rule and says:
"The liability of the keeper of premises and the right
of protection of an invitee may, of course, be a limited
one and cannot go beyond the invitation. There are
many cases to that effect, many of them holding that
an invitee goes beyond the scope of, and violates, the
invitation when he goes into some part of the premises
where he is not invited, and where the purpose of his
visit do not warrant him to go. The duty to protect an
invitee is necessarily coextensive with the invitation,
though no further."
See also the following cases discussing the same rule:
Kinsman vs Barton and Company
251 Pac. 563
Gavin vs O'Connor
122 Atl. 842-30 A. L. R. 1383
Robinson vs Leighton
119 Atl. 809 - 30 A. L. R. 1326
Landers vs Brooks
154 Northeastern 265 - 49 A. L. R. 562
Butnick vs J. & M., Inc.
59 P. 2nd 750
Dobbie vs Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
273 Pac. 630

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13

The courts sometimes refer to the situation as that of exceeding the bounds of permission to enter upon the owner's
premises. See, for instance,
Hickman vs Sisters of Charity
106 P. 2nd 593
That is precisely what we claim in this case. While the boy
had the right to enter the main building and (it might be well
argued) that he had the right to park his car at places provided
for parking, yet he certainly exceeded the bounds of any invitation, express or implied, when, without permission and in violation of company rules, he put his car at the point in question.
The question of who are invitees is discussed in 45 C. J.
commencing at Page 809, Section 220 and continues to Page
788. It is, of course, impracticable to cite the cases or to quote
from the text. However, we specifically call the court's attention to Page 812 wherein the author discusses "circumstances not amounting to an invitation" in the following
language:
"Use of premises without the owner's knowledge or occasional use in disregard of the owner's apparent intentions, cannot give the user the status of an invitee.
Neither does the mere fact that a certain use of property is confined to the user give rise to an implication
of an invitation to make such use of it".
In 45 C. J., Page 788, Section 194, the author discusses
who are licensees and shows the distinction between a licensee
and an invitee.
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What then was the duty which the defendant, as owner
of the premises, owed to the plaintiff, the owner of the automobile placed as it was in front of the company garage? This
duty depends upon whether the relationship is that of trespasser, licensee or invitee. The cases are legion which discuss
this duty and differentiate between the three situations. This
court, in accord with many other states, holds that where the
person is an invitee, the owner or occupant of the premises
owes him a duty of reasonable or ordinary care to keep premises in a safe and suitable condition so that he will not be unnecessarily or unreasonably exposed to danger.
Winteroad vs Christensen
68 Utah 546
251 Pac. 360
Quinn vs Utah Gas & Coke Company
42 Utah 113
129 Pac. 362
On the other hand, it is universally held that the owner of
premises is not an insurer of the safety of its invitees. It is

equally well settled that as to a licensee, the owner or occupant
of land owes only the duty of not wilfully or wantonly
injuring him.
Garner vs Pacific Coast Coal Company
100 P. 2nd, 32
Dobbie vs Pacific Gas & Electric Company
273 Pac. 630
Borgnis vs California Oregon Power Company
258 Pac. 630
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Buttnick vs J. & M., Inc.
59 Po. 2nd, 750
Schock vs Ringling Brothers
105 P. 2nd, 838
Holm vs Investment & Securities Company
79 P. 2nd, 708
Kines vs Lang
57 A. L. R. 1022
On the other hand, if there is any distinction between
the duty owed to a trespasser and that of a lic~nsee, the duty
would be still less toward a trespasser.
Jensen vs Utah Railway Company
72 Utah 366
270 Pac. 349
lays down the rule that the only duty owed a trespasser is to
use care after the presence of the trespasser is actually discovered. The subject is annotated in
89 A. L. R. at Page 757
and the note refers to previous annotations.
From the foregoing authorities, it is clear, we think, that
the duty resting upon the defendant in this case is dependent
on the status of the plaintiff's property but, in no event, does
the defendant owe a greater duty even toward an invitee than
that of reasonable care.
Our first assignment of error challenges the sufficiency
of plaintiff's complaint. We contend that the court erred in
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overruling our demurrer for the reason that plaintiff's complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to show that the automobile in question was placed at the point indicated at the invitation, express or implied, of the defendant and, if it does
not allege facts sufficient to create the relationship of invitee,
then the complaint does not state a cause of action because it
shows no breech of duty toward a licensee or trespasser.
Assignment Number Two attacks the ruling of the court
in denying defendant's motion for a nonsuit. This matter
may be reserved for further consideration in connection with
the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur. However, at this point, we
call the court's attention to the fact that the plaintiff's evidence failed to show that the defendant owed the plainiff,
or his automobile the duty of an invitee. The most that can be
said of the evidence presented by the plaintiff was that in
placing the car at the point in question, the relationship was
either that of a trespasser or, at most, a mere licensee, and,
if such was the relationship, how can it be argued that there
was any evidence, even under the Res Ipsa Loquitur doctrine,
to even suggest a wilfull or wanton act on the part of the defendant? We contend that when the plaintiff rested without
offering evidence sufficient in law to show the status of an
invitee, that the court should have granted the motion for a
non suit.

DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR
Counsel contends, and the court seemed to have adopted
his contention, that under the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur
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the court was justified in inferring negligence. The last case
to be decided by this court on the subject is that of
\Yhite vs Pinney
108 P. 2nd, 249
in which Mr. Justice Larson very carefully reviews the authorities and discusses this rule. It is our belief that this case
effectively disposes of this question and demonstrates why a
judgment should have been entered in favor of the defendant.
As stated by him,
''The doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur is that when a thing
which causes injury is shown to be under the exclusive
control of the defendant and the injury is such as in
the ordinary course of things does not occur if the one
having such control uses proper care, the happening
of the accident is evidence sufficient to justify an inference that defendant did not exercise due and proper
care, the effect of the doctrine being evidentiary.
Where plaintiff has made out a prima facie case for
recovery for injury caused by alleged neglect of defendant, defendant may escape liability by showing
that defendant exercised all the care commensurate
with the damages to be apprehended, which careful
and prudent men would have exercised under the circumstances. Where plaintiff has made out a prima
facie case for recovery under Res Ipsa Loquitur doctrine, the burden of going forward with the evidence
shifts to the defendant to show that he was not guilty
of negligence."
In this case, the plaintiff merely proved the ownership of
the automobile, the ownership of the premises by defendant,
the nature of the boy's employment, the placing of the car at
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the point indicated, the falling of the wall, the resulting damage, and then rested. If he made out a prima facie case under
the theory of this doctrine, against whom did he make out a
prima facie case? Did he make out such a case in favor of a
trespasser or a licensee, or even an invitee? Is there any presumption under this doctrine that the defendant acted wilfully
or wantonly, as is required to recover in case of a trespasser
or licensee? Did the plaintiff make out a prima facie case
that the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care in not
discovering the weakness in the wall, or, putting it another
way, did the happening of the event justify an inference that
the building was weak, that the defendant knew, or ought to
have known, it was weak or, in case of a licensee, that it wilfully and wantonly injured the plaintiff's property? However
this may be, as we understand the doctrine, if plaintiff did
make out a prima facie case from which a court might infer
liability as against either an invitee, licensee or trespasser,
then it became the duty of the defendant to go forward and
make explanation. This the defendant did and the evidence
is not in any way disputed. What, then, did the defendant
prove? It was proved:
1. That the building was constructed twenty years
ago by a building contractor and it was constructed
out of reinforced concrete and brick, the usual and
proper method of building buildings.
2. That the building was in a good state of repair and
that there were no patent defects which would be
discovered by an inspection.
thereby clearly distinguishing the situation from that presented to the court in the case of Winterroad vs Christensen,
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cited supra, where the court calls attention to the fact that the
board in the platform which gave way was decomposed and
its condition could clearly be seen by inspection, and the court
uses the following language:
"The particular fact of controlling importance is
whether from the circumstances it can be fairly inferred that a reasonable inspection by defendant would
have discovered the defect."
3. That within two months prior to the accident, the
defendant inspected the building and found nothing
to indicate any weakness or anything to suggest a
dangerous condition.
4. That the canopy was properly and securely braced

and supported by steel rods extending from the top
of the building.
5. That the defendant removed the snow off the roof
whenever there was any appreciable accumulation;
and that on the day of the accident there was only
a small amount of snow on the roof.
6. That the defendant, or its officers or employees,
did not know what caused the accident.
As above noted, none of these facts are disputed. What
then is the situation? Assume that the plaintiff has made out
a prima facie case under this evidentiary rule, but the defendant then goes forward and proves by clear and convincing
evidence facts which in law would exonerate it from any liability. Can the court disregard those facts which are in no way
disputed and still infer a breach of duty? Here again we de-
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sire, even at the expense of repetition, to remind the court
that the defendant is not an insurer of the safety of its guests.
Neither is it an insurer that its building will not fall. It is
merely required to show, even as against an invitee, that it
exercised reasonable care for the safety of its guests and, if it
discharges this obligation, even though an accident happens
and even though the same cannot be explained, can a court,
after a full explanation, infer not the fact that the building was
weak, not the fact that the building jell, but the further fact
that the defendant knowingly maintained upon its premises
a building which was in an unsafe or dangerous condition, or
that there were facts which could be discovered by reasonable
care from which the owner could have learned of the unsafe
or dangerous condition? Therein it seems to us is the vice of
the court's ruling and the danger of a literal application of the
doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur. By resorting to this evidentiary
presumption, the court has in effect said, notwithstanding you
have made full explanation; notwithstanding your evidence
stands uncontradicted; and, notwithstanding the fact that this
building was properly constructed, was in an apparently safe
condition, was not an old delapidated building; and, notwithstanding the fact that you made regular inspections and did
not discover its dangerous condition, yet, I hold that, because
the building fell, therefore, it was inherently weak and you
should have known it and you are liable, not because you knew
or should have known of the dangerous condition, but you are
liable because the building, having fallen, must have been in a
dangerous and unsafe condition. Is this not akin to holding
that the owner of premises is an absolute guarantor of the
safety of persons upon the premises, irrespective of the relationship? Is it not an application of the doctrine of main-
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taining a dangerous instrumentality upon ones premises? Does
it not in effect amount to a holding that if a building falls, and
the cause thereof cannot be satisfactorily explained as being
due to some catastrophe, that the owner is liable for the consequences? Does it not amount to this, that the so called rule
of Res Ipsa Loquitur, which is only a presumptive evidentiary
rule, change itself into a rule of absolute liability and become
a rule of substantive law, rather than evidence? \Vhy, may I
ask, should the application of this doctrine enlarge the liability
of an owner or occupant of property? If this judgment can
be sustained, then we say that, as a result of this fiction, the
owner of property becomes an insurer; that no matter how
careful one may be in employing competent men to erect a
building, and no matter how careful he may subsequently be
in keeping the building in proper repair and in making inspection, yet he is at all times liable to any person who may be on
his property, should the building collapse, even though he did
not nor, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, could not have
known that the building was weak or inherently dangerous.
\Ve do not think it necessary or proper to cite the many
cases involving this doctrine. We admit its application in
proper cases. We think it is salutary in requiring defendant
to go forward and make satisfactory explanation, but we do
not think citation of cases will be very helpful with respect to
these particular facts. In fact, we have searched diligently
through the books but have not been able to find a case which
supports the position of the plaintiff.
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We cite the following cases without further discussion:
Zoccolillo vs Oregon Short Line
177 Pac. 201
Paul vs Salt Lake Railway Company
95 Pac. 363
Denver vs Spencer
82 Pac. 59
Kennedy vs Hawkins
102 Pac. 733
Nucek vs Weaver
54 P. 2nd, 768
wherein the court uses the following language:
"Where presumption of negligence of defendant arises
from the happening of an accident defendant assumes
the burden of advancing evidence not to satisfactorily
account for the accident and to show the actual cause
of injury, but merely to rebut inference that he has
failed to use due care."
Lyman vs Knickerbocker Theatre Company
5 F. 2nd, 538
Pickwick Corporation vs Messinger
36 P. 2nd, 168
Assignment of Error Number Four attacks the conclusion
of law that the defendant's negligent acts or ommissions
caused the damage. Wherein is there any evidence of negligent acts on the part of the defendant? What acts or omissions did the defendant do?
We also attack that part of finding Number Three, Assignment Five, where the court found that the boy parked the
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car at a place where others had parked their automobiles.
There is no evidence that others parked their cars at the point
in front of the garage door where the boy parked his but, even
though there is such evidence that the company permitted
employees to do this, does this justify a guest doing the same
thing?
Also we challenge that part of finding Number Four
where the court found that the automobile was parked with
the consent and permission of defendant and that defendant
know, or should have known, of the unsafe and unsound con~ition of said wall. Here again we repeat what we have said
before that to make such a finding is equivalent to the court
refusing to believe uncontradicted testimony. There may be
an inference that the wall was unsafe but there certainly can
be no inference that the defendant knew, or should have
known, the unsafe condition.
We submit that the complaint does not state a cause of
action; that the court should have granted defendant's motion
for a non suit; that, in any event, those portions of the findings attacked can find no support in the evidence that the
judgment cannot be supported from the findings or the law
applicable thereto; that the cause should be reversed with
instructions to dismiss the complaint.
Respectfully submitted,
THATCHER & YOUNG,

Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant.
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